The recent re-announcement of the Cancer Moonshot highlighted a common enemy to many endeavors to improve our society as a whole, and that is using common sense and already known methods.
At a high level The goal of the Cancer Moonshot Scholars program is to inspire and support the next generation of world-class and diverse researchers focused on scientific breakthroughs that will make a difference for patients and drive progress toward the goal of ending cancer as we know it today. source fact sheet
As stories of this announcement filtered thru news outlets with interviews of medical professionals, a known thread appeared. Both lacking in the message, and the single greatest advancement to the problem, which is already known, is prevention. This includes known prevention measures, early detection measures, and education.
As a Data Strategist, Data Security is a critical component of any business and the single best defense is prevention and using common sense.
Here are just some simple basics that seem to have to be discussed and argued repeatedly company after company, product after product, yet there is no single effort to eliminate these poor practices.
- No clear text passwords. If you have to enter a password on the command line (cough cough AWS CLI) or put a clear text password in a configuration file (cough cough 100s of products), you enable simple techniques to obtain unvetted access to your data.
- Using clear text passwords is amplified when products offer a more secure means of access and identity management but they do not employ it everywhere.Check out Password Plaintext Storage
- Clear text transport. It pains me to say it but even in recent employment that held critical PII data, I could not enforce TLS communication between applications and databases. While it was as simple as a configuration option, the constant excuses by engineering management were it was too hard to implement (cough cough BS).
- The default configuration settings for a product need to be secure, not the default that is most compatible with prior versions. For example, if you launch a new cloud instance database with defaults, is it the most secure options, or the least secure options>
- Credential rotation. Long-lived credentials should just be eliminated. Often these are also not named users, but commonly used processes.
- Communicating passwords in clear text. This should never ever happen, yet it does. Have you ever received an (insecure protocol) email saying here is your username and password? A short known list of 5880+ sites can be found in the https://plaintextoffenders.com/ list on github offenders.csv.
- Data systems accessible via the public internet For example MongoDB article, MySQL/MariaDB article, Redis & ElasticSearch etc, etc
- Data systems that have no credentials required
- Data systems that have default credentials that were never changed
- Storing passwords in clear text
- Storing passwords with a single salt
- Storing passwords with a symmetric encryption approach
- Administrators that use a common account for “root” privileges, not individual named accounts
- Not patching products with fixed vulnerabilities CVS Program Mission
- and the list could go on and on….
In all of the above points, there are numerous examples of these data security anti-patterns. While many are due to the products in use, some of these examples represent poor business practices. It should not have to be explained that most attacks and breaches are internal. The common and very incorrect attitude of, we are within our Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) we do not need to encrypt our data is well, plainly wrong.
One of the greatest threats to businesses is ransomware. Attackers gain access to system via various means, those above are just the simplest means and then hold businesses ransom. Ransomware has multiple impacts including the loss of a business operating, the process and time of making a decision, the penalty for payment to release the random, and generally the threat of release of their data if a fine is not paid.
There is a lot to unpack even with this ransomware statement. Can you not restore your entire business operations within a suitable RTO and RPO? Is important data not encrypted. Are passwords in your business able to de-encrypted (this should never even be possible). Do you have a disaster recovery (DR) strategy? Can you access critical data via others means and systems independently?
The stigma of a ransomware attack is organizations do not share this openly. They do not share why it happened, what could have been done to prevent this, and sharing all information with federal authorities that should be tracking all occurrences. This information is an important and critical education feedback loop for the whole industry and IMO lacking of attention. Do you know of a website that shared known ransomware attack vectors.
If security is an important aspect to the data in your organization, can you name the people in your security department? Can any individual point out an insecure product with a known fixed vulnerability? Is that information transparent? Is there a process to address that as a top priority, moving engineering and operations goals accordingly? While organizations may employ an error budget for outages, do they employ a security vulnerability budget? Do companies note version updates of all their software, have people read ALL the release notes of each point release, or even know every version of each software product in use in the organization?
For more information, check out
- Open Web Application Security Project
- CVE® Program Mission
- Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
- Open Source Software Security Mobilization Plan
There will always be better and more determined attempts to attack data systems, we have to stop the most obvious first, and we have to participate in identification and remediation endeavors.
Using a simple relatable example to every person, your home. We should start with not leaving the door open, or leaving the keys in the door or simply removing the door all together.